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I. INTRODUCTION
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 1 Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun wrote, “[t]he
States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or
potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies.” 2
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court took a different position in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 3 In a plurality
opinion, the Casey Court set forth a new standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of statutes that regulate abortion, known as the “undue
burden” standard. 4 One of the Court’s primary motivations for
promulgating this new standard was to allow states, in their regulatory
capacity, to express their preference for childbirth over abortion.5 The
undue burden standard, however, lacks any objectively ascertainable
elements, making it very easy to manipulate and very difficult for the
circuit courts to apply consistently.6
The process of informed consent as we know it is eroding under the
undue burden standard. The standard’s failure to adequately distinguish
between permissible and impermissible regulations, coupled with the
high level of deference to legislatures, enables states to debase informed
consent statutes by improperly requiring disclosure of one-sided moral
and political information, as opposed to the objective medical
information of which these statutes are rightly and typically comprised.7
† J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A. Sociology, University
of Delaware, 2011. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Ronald Riccio,
for his invaluable insight and encouragement throughout the writing process and my law
school career as a whole. I am also appreciative of the Seton Hall Circuit Review
members, Comments Committee, and Editorial Board for their hard work and dedication.
Finally, I would like to extend special thanks to my family and friends, for their constant
and unconditional love and support.
1
476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
2
Id. at 759.
3
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4
Id. at 877.
5
Id. at 883, 916.
6
Id. at 986; see also infra Part IV (discussing various circuit courts’ application of
the undue burden standard).
7
Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 66–67 (2012) (“There
is no doubt that the abortion-specific biased counseling statutes discussed fail the AMA’s
ethical standards, especially since the AMA ‘opposes legislative measures that would
impose procedure-specific requirements for informed consent or a waiting period for any
legal medical procedure.’ The requirement that physicians present facts accurately
disqualifies deceptive and misleading statements. Making statements that the patient does
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As a result, what was once a private, personal, and professional dialogue
between physicians and their patients concerning medically objective and
relevant information is warping into a monologue of legislatively
coerced recitations of anti-abortion propaganda.8 Therefore, contrary to
Justice Blackmun’s proclamation, under the undue burden standard states
are free to intimidate women into continuing their pregnancies under the
guise of protecting maternal health and potential life. 9 The question
before the circuit courts is whether states may do so by disguising their
moral propaganda as medically accurate and relevant information, and by
coercing physicians to deliver this ideology as a part of the process of
informed consent to the abortion procedure.10
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) defines informed
consent as “a process of communication between a patient and physician
that results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a
specific medical intervention.” 11 On the AMA website, under the
heading “Patient Physician Relationship Topics,” the AMA lists a
number of guidelines that physicians should follow in soliciting a
patient’s informed consent.12 The AMA suggests that physicians discuss
the diagnosis, nature, purpose, risks and benefits of the suggested
not want to hear is unethical according to the AMA, and the patient’s expressed desire
not to be given certain information should be respected. Finally, there is nothing that
provides support for forcing patients to be exposed to the results of an ultrasound against
their wishes.”).
8
Id. at 70 (“Abortion opponents have attempted to co-opt the doctrine of informed
consent to further their political goal of reducing the number of abortions . . . This vision
should be rejected, as should the cynical use of the banner of informed consent to
disguise an anti-abortion agenda . . . biased counseling laws . . . cannot be part of ethical
informed consent practices because they are designed to make women’s choices
regarding ending their pregnancies less well-informed and less voluntary, all in the hope
of discouraging abortions.”) (emphasis added).
9
See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling
Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y
REV. 4 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gpr100406.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013); Joerg Dreweke & Rebecca Wind, State Mandated Abortion Counseling
Materials Often Medically Inaccurate, Biased, GUTTMACHER INST., (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2006/10/26/index.html. See also infra Part IV.
10
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d
889 (8th Cir. 2012); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 467 F.3d 716 (8th
Cir. 2006); see also Stuart v. Huff, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2011 WL 6740400 (M.D.N.C. Dec.
22, 2011), aff’d, No. 12-1052, 2013 WL 265083 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2013).
11
AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legaltopics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.page (last visited Jan. 21,
2013) (emphasis added).
12
Id.
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treatment; the risks and benefits of alternative treatments; and the risks
and benefits of refraining from treatment altogether.13 Nowhere does the
AMA suggest that physicians should offer patients their personal moral
or political opinions about a given treatment, let alone states’ moral and
political viewpoints.14 In fact, apart from stating that obtaining informed
consent is both a legal and ethical obligation, the AMA guidelines do not
suggest that states play any role in shaping the informed consent
dialogue.15
While AMA guidelines govern the process of informed consent for
most medical procedures, the process of informed consent to an abortion
has strayed drastically from that paradigm.16 This shift is attributable to
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey17 and Gonzalez v. Carhart.18 Some states have
argued that the holdings of these cases give them license to commandeer
the physician-patient relationship in the context of abortion to ensure that
“so grave a choice is well informed.”19 Apparently these states do not
consider the AMA’s standard process of informed consent, which is both
legally and ethically adequate to inform patients of all relevant
information all other medial procedures, to be sufficient to ensure
informed consent to the abortion procedure.20 Or perhaps these states
question women’s ability to make informed decisions.21 Whatever their
13

Id.
Id.
15
See id.
16
See State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last
updated Sept. 12, 2013). See generally Gold & Nash, supra note 9.
17
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
19
Id. at 158; see also cases cited supra note 10.
20
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (“Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or
continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is
prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even
in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight
that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that
there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a
certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”).
21
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224–25 (2009) (“Carhart’s portrayal of
women evokes a century-old societal view of femininity. The Carhart Court’s cabined
view of women’s decision-making capacity reflects a gender-stereotyped view of
women’s nature. The Court also exposed its discriminatory view of women as decisionmakers by articulating a new paradigm of “informed consent” in the abortion context that
controverts well-established rules of patients’ right to informed consent in healthcare law.
14
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motive, these states have reformed their informed consent statutes in the
context of abortion to exploit the laxity and latitude Casey and Carhart
provide.22
These recently revised informed consent statutes have been subject
to constitutional challenges on both First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds.23 Many mandated specific disclosures have been challenged as
violating physicians’ First Amendment free speech rights by
unconstitutionally compelling their speech. 24 These statutes have also
been challenged as unconstitutionally violating women’s Fourteenth
Amendment privacy rights by imposing an undue burden upon their right
to have an abortion. 25 Statutes regulating abortion are not evaluated
under traditional First or Fourteenth Amendment principles, however.26
Rather, statutes that regulate abortion are analyzed under the undue
burden standard promulgated in Casey. 27 When evaluating similar
statutes, some courts have held that they are constitutional under the
undue burden standard, some have held that they are not, and still others
have upheld or invalidated these statutes on First Amendment grounds.28
Though the Casey Court did hold that states have the right to express
their preference for childbirth and to persuade women not to have an
abortion, the Court did not intend to allow states to convey their
preference for childbirth by integrating mandatory disclosures of
inaccurate, misleading, and irrelevant information into the informed

This article focuses on Carhart’s disturbing reasoning—that competent adult women lack
the capacity to determine for themselves what is best for their own health—and evaluates
its implications in the abortion context and in other areas of medical treatment related to
pregnancy.”); Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 13 (“These examples show the Court’s
willingness to accept the notion that women’s decision-making abilities are deficient,
which is supposed to justify forcing women to receive certain information, to endure
mandatory waiting periods, and to have some options taken away from them
altogether.”).
22
State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note
16; see also cases cited supra note 10.
23
See cases cited supra note 10.
24
See cases cited supra note 10.
25
See cases cited supra note 10.
26
See cases cited supra note 10. See generally Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27
See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
28
See cases cited supra note 10.
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consent process.29 Yet, some courts have permitted this practice under
the undue burden standard.30
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on the history
and fundamental principles of informed consent. Part III reviews the
Supreme Court cases that have shaped abortion jurisprudence and
promulgated the standards for evaluating the constitutionality of
informed consent statutes. Part IV discusses four federal circuit court
opinions that have explicitly acknowledged the existence of confusion
and inconsistency in courts’ application of the undue burden standard,31
and then provides examples of confused, conflated and inconsistent
application of the undue burden standard through an analysis of two
recent circuit court cases.32
Lastly, Part V provides an in depth discussion of the proposed
solution, namely, that the undue burden standard should be restructured
into a three-prong test that courts can apply more objectively and
consistently, thereby effectuating the intent of the Casey Court while
preserving the integrity of the informed consent process.33 Organizing
the elements of the undue burden standard into a structured, three-prong,
disjunctive test would require courts to engage in a complete analysis
and prevent them from manipulating the undue burden standard by
emphasizing just one of the elements.34 Under this proposed test, the
burden would be on the plaintiff challenging the statute to demonstrate
that: (1) the mandated disclosure or disclosures are (a) not truthful, (b)
misleading, or (c) irrelevant to the abortion procedure; (2) the statute is
29
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 878–82 (1992) (“[I]f the information the State requires to
be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible.”) (emphasis added).
30
See generally Vandewalker, supra note 7; Gold & Nash, supra note 9.
31
Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999);
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999) on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side
Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
32
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 530 F.3d 724,
753 (8th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716, 722
(8th Cir. 2006).
33
Casey, 505 U.S. at 930 (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, and far
less manipulable, than the undue burden standard adopted by the joint opinion.”)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 985–86 (“[I]ts efforts
at clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently manipulable and will prove
hopelessly unworkable in practice.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34
See infra discussion Part V.
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not calculated to inform women’s decision, and therefore has an
improper purpose; or (3) the statute has the effect of creating a
substantial obstacle for women seeking an abortion.35 If a plaintiff were
able to demonstrate any of the above, the statute would fail the undue
burden analysis and would be struck down as an unconstitutional undue
burden on women’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to an abortion.
Courts would engage in an exhaustive analysis of each prong before
determining that a challenged statute is constitutional.
The proposed solution would also require each subpart of the first
prong of the analysis, namely, whether the information is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the abortion procedure, to be evaluated
independently. 36
Finally, this solution would decrease judicial
deference to legislatures in evaluating the first and second prongs of the
analysis.37 Adopting a structured reformulation of the standard would
permit states to further their interests in protecting potential life and
expressing their preference for childbirth, more effectively protect
women’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to an abortion, and enable
the circuit courts to evaluate abortion regulations impartially and
consistently. This Comment concludes by briefly discussing the public
policy consequences of failing to reform the problematic undue burden
standard, as well as the public policy benefits of adopting the proposed
solution.
II. INFORMED CONSENT TO MEDICAL PROCEDURES
The central guiding principles of informed consent are patient
autonomy and self-determination.38 There are five elements to informed
consent: (1) disclosure; (2) understanding; (3) voluntariness; (4)
35
See infra discussion Part V. Each of the elements of the suggested three-prong
analysis is present in the Casey joint opinion. The solution lays both in organizing the
elements in a way that is more rigid and easier to apply, and in making the additional
proposed adjustments in applying the rigid version of the standard. See generally Casey,
505 U.S. 833.
36
See infra discussion Part V.
37
See infra discussion Part V; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (“The proper focus of
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant. Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert
testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether in a large fraction of the cases
in which the restriction is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Hana Osman, History and Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4
INT’L ELEC. J. OF HEALTH EDUC. 41, 44–45 (2001), available at http://js.sagamorepub
.com/gjhep/article/view/4073 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
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competence; and (5) consent.39 This Comment focuses on disclosure and
voluntariness, and how the undue burden standard has been used to
uphold anti-abortion regulations that undermine these fundamental
elements of informed consent.40
Disclosure is the most pertinent element of informed consent for
purposes of this Comment, as the majority of constitutional challenges to
recent informed consent statutes focus on provisions involving
mandatory informational disclosures. 41 There are three different
standards for the informed consent disclosure requirement.42 The first is
the professional practice standard, which emphasizes the patients’ best
medical interests, as determined by the physician. 43 The reasonable
person standard, on the other hand, places the most emphasis on patient
autonomy and self-determination, and attempts to determine what the
patient’s best medical interests are as perceived by the patient, not the
physician.44 Finally, the subjective standard suggests that maximization
of autonomy requires the quantity and quality of information to be
tailored to each of the individual patients based on their needs. 45 While
the subjective standard is arguably preferable, each standard has its
respective strengths and weaknesses.46
Voluntariness is also critical to obtaining informed consent. 47
Voluntary agreement to a given treatment is central to patient autonomy
and self determination because patients are only able to make educated
and rational decisions if they are not being manipulated, pressured, or
coerced to elect an option to which they are resistant. 48 Though
physicians will inevitably influence their patients’ decisions to some
degree, the process of informed consent fails if physicians coerce their
patients to select a given course of treatment. 49 Manipulation is
considered a form of coercion in the context of informed consent because
it diminishes patients’ capacity to arrive at intelligent and informed
39

Id.
See infra discussion Part IV.
41
See cases cited supra notes 10, 31, and 32.
42
Osman, supra note 38, at 44.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Osman, supra note 38, at 41, 45 (citing EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO AND DAVID C.
THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MED. PRACTICE. (New York: Oxford University Press.
1993)).
49
Id.
40
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decisions.50 Therefore, decisions that result from the use of manipulative
tactics are not considered to be the result of patients’ own free choice and
do not meet the voluntariness requirement of informed consent.51
Before Casey, informed consent statutes typically required that
physicians discuss certain topics with their patients, but physicians
retained the discretion to decide the specific information to disclose
about that topic.52 In line with the subjective and professional practice
approaches of disclosure, physicians were free to convey information
regarding each topic that, in their professional, medical opinion, was
most accurate, credible, and germane to their patients’ specific
circumstances.53 Recently revised informed consent statutes, however,
force physicians to disclose specific information that states consider
accurate, significant, and relevant, without regard to physicians’
professional judgment. 54 These revised statutes do not fall within the
parameters of any recognized standards of disclosure.
Today, most states’ informed consent statutes have more stringent
requirements for the abortion procedure than are required for any other
medical procedure.55 The provisions of informed consent statutes that
apply to abortion are not only harsh and inflexible; some go as far as
requiring that misleading statements be made to patients. 56 These
50

See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 38–40.
Id.
52
See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999).
53
Id.
54
See Manian, supra note 21; see also infra note 83.
55
See State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra
note 16; see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 10, 31, and 32; see also Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (“Despite the fact that apparently no other
Missouri statute . . . requires a patient’s prior written consent to a surgical procedure, the
imposition . . . of such a requirement for termination of pregnancy even during the first
stage, in our view, is not in itself an unconstitutional requirement . . . . we see no
constitutional defect in requiring [written consent] only for some types of surgery as, for
example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a
specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.”). Contra State Facts About
Abortion: New Jersey, State Center, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org
/pubs/sfaa/new_jersey.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (“Abortion is one of the safest
surgical procedures for women in the United States.”).
56
See Amanda McMurray Roe, Not-So-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient
Relationship to Promote State-Supported Outcomes, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 205, 206–
07 (2009) (“The relatively recent development of informed consent statutes for specific
procedures, however, seems to have upended the traditional notion of informed consent.
Instead of promoting autonomous choice, these statutes mandate that doctors provide
particular disclosures about certain procedures. In addition, rather than providing patients
with objective information, some of these statutes appear to provide patients with slanted
information that pushes them toward a predetermined ‘right’ choice.”); see also Chinué
51
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statutes mandate the delivery of certain materials and information that
states claim is essential to the process of obtaining women’s informed
consent to an abortion. 57 These so-called informed consent statutes
undermine the goals of informed consent by disseminating false or
incomplete information. 58 Many of the disclosures the states have
mandated in these revised statutes consist of information that is disputed
within the medical community or taken out of context, 59 as well as
information that pertains solely to the embryo or fetus, and not the risks
and benefits of the procedure itself.60 These statutes, more accurately
described as anti-abortion statutes, undermine the principle of patient
autonomy and demote patient wellbeing, the primary tenets and goals of
informed consent. 61 Nevertheless, state legislatures are passing these
anti-abortion statutes under the guise of informed consent, and some
courts are upholding them under the protection of the amorphous undue
burden standard.62
III. EVOLUTION OF INFORMED CONSENT STATUTES FOR ABORTION
PROCEDURES THROUGH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Road To Casey
States’ ability to regulate abortion has varied over the past forty
years. In Roe v. Wade63 the Supreme Court held that women’s ability to
choose whether to terminate their pregnancies is a fundamental right.64
Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Inaccuracy of
State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4, 6 (2006),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2013) (“In some cases, the state goes so far as to include information that is patently
inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence to the charge that states’ abortion counseling
mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women about the abortion procedure
than to discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.”).
57
Richardson & Nash, supra note 56, at 6.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See generally Richardson & Nash, supra note 56. See also State Policies In Brief:
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 16.
61
Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 45–49.
62
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d
889 (8th Cir. 2012).
63
410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64
Id. at 169–70 (“As recently as last Term, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, we recognized the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
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Adhering to the traditional Fourteenth Amendment practice of applying
strict scrutiny when states abridge fundamental rights, the Court balanced
the competing interests; women’s right to terminate their pregnancies
against states’ interest in protecting women’s life and health and the
potential life of the fetus.65 The result was the “trimester framework,”
which allowed varying levels of regulation based upon the increasing
strength of the states’ interest as the pregnancy progressed.66 In the first
trimester, the states were not permitted to interfere with women’s right to
terminate their pregnancies in any way whatsoever.67 During the second
trimester, only those regulations intended to preserve the life or health of
women were permitted.68 States had broadest authority to regulate the
abortion procedure in the third trimester. 69 States were permitted to
enact statutes that regulated third trimester abortions if the statutes were
designed to preserve the life or health of women or the potential life of
the fetus.70
Despite the trimester framework’s alleged prohibition of states’
interference during the first trimester of women’s pregnancies, the Court
in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth 71 upheld a Missouri
informed consent statute for pre-viability abortion under Roe. 72 The
Court’s decision to uphold a statute requiring women to sign an informed
consent form before obtaining a first-trimester abortion was the Supreme
Court’s first decision upholding a regulation during the first trimester
through informed consent under Roe’s trimester framework.73 Perhaps
unaware of the floodgates it was opening, the Court held that requiring
written informed consent to abortion was constitutional, despite being the
only medical procedure for which written informed consent was required
in Missouri at the time. 74 This was the first case in which the Court

or beget a child. That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 162–66.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
71
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
72
Id. at 67.
73
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 55.
74
428 U.S. at 67.
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suggested that, due to the nature of the abortion decision, the state has an
interest in ensuring the decision is fully informed.75
A few years later, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 76 the Court again acknowledged states’
interest in ensuring that women’s decisions are informed, as described in
Danforth, but nevertheless struck down an informed consent provision
on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional violation of women’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion.77 The Court held that the
informed consent provision was invalid because it did not give
physicians adequate discretion to determine what information to disclose
to patients, considering patients’ specific, individual circumstances. 78
The Court also concluded that the statute impermissibly attempted to
persuade women to continue their pregnancies.79 The majority in Akron
struck down the informed consent provision on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, but added that such informed consent statutes may violate the
First Amendment as well.80
75

Id. (“The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it
is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the
decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of
requiring her prior written consent.”). This was also one of the first cases dealing with an
informed consent statute; previous cases typically dealt with statutes expressly and
directly prohibiting or limiting access to the procedure. See generally, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
76
462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
77
Id. at 443.
78
Id. at 443–44 (“It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure
that appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular
circumstances. Danforth’s recognition of the State’s interest in ensuring that this
information be given will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the
woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.”).
79
Id. at 444 (holding that the statute “attempts to extend the State’s interest in
ensuring ‘informed consent’ beyond permissible limits” because “the information
required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to
withhold it altogether”).
80
Id. at 472 (“This is not to say that the informed consent provisions may not violate
the First Amendment rights of the physician if the State requires him or her to
communicate its ideology. However, it does not appear that Akron Center raised any
First Amendment argument in the Court below.”) (citations omitted). This serves as an
interesting point of reference because while the Court here was only beginning to
consider the First Amendment implications of informed consent statutes, recent informed
consent statutes are repeatedly challenged on both First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds today. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds
(Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds
(Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006). Cf. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
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The Court found another informed consent statute to be invalid in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,81
under similar reasoning. 82 Citing Akron, the Court again ruled on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, striking the informed consent provision
down due to the specific and, in the Court’s opinion, irrelevant
disclosures that the statute required. 83
The dissenting opinion in
Thornburgh also expressly addressed the potential First Amendment
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing undue burden under the
Fourteenth Amendment although plaintiff only challenged on First Amendment grounds).
While questions regarding the interaction of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
analysis of informed consent statutes sprouted from the majority’s dicta, the dissenting
opinion seems to have planted the seed for the undue burden standard. Akron, 462 U.S.
at 453 (“In my view, this ‘unduly burdensome’ standard should be applied to the
challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular
‘stage’ of pregnancy involved. If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burden’ the
fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination
that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.”) (citations omitted).
The dissent proposed the undue burden standard as a possible analytical framework for
abortion cases, but also suggested that deference to legislative determinations regarding
whether a given regulation is “unduly burdensome” is not appropriate. Id.
81
476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
82
Id. at 764 (“The requirement . . . that the woman be informed by the physician of
‘detrimental physical and psychological effects’ and of all ‘particular medical risks’
compound the problem of medical attendance, increase the patient’s anxiety, and intrude
upon the physician’s exercise of proper professional judgment. This type of compelled
information is the antithesis of informed consent. That the Commonwealth does not, and
surely would not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery
or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real
purpose. Pennsylvania, like Akron, ‘has gone far beyond merely describing the general
subject matter relevant to informed consent.’ In addition, the Commonwealth would
require the physician to recite its litany ‘regardless of whether in his judgment the
information is relevant to [the patient’s] personal decision.’ These statutory defects
cannot be saved by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing.”)
(citations omitted).
83
Id. at 763 (“The requirements of [the statute] that the woman be advised that
medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father is responsible for
financial assistance in the support of the child similarly are poorly disguised elements of
discouragement for the abortion decision. Much of this would be nonmedical information
beyond the physician’s area of expertise and, for many patients, would be irrelevant and
inappropriate. For a patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the “information” in its
very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship.
As any experienced social worker or other counselor knows, theoretical financial
responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. And a victim of rape should not
have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for support if she
continues the pregnancy to term. Under the guise of informed consent, the Act requires
the dissemination of information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it
advances no legitimate state interest.”).
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implications of these informed consent statutes, 84 but contrary to the
dissent in Akron, suggested that regulations should be evaluated using
rational basis review under which the states are afforded a heavy dose of
deference.85
In the cases following Roe v. Wade, members of the Court
suggested various standards for evaluating the constitutionality of
statutes that regulate abortion, but it was Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services86 that bespoke the demise of Roe’s trimester framework.87 The
Court explicitly articulated the intent to abandon the trimester
framework, and also suggested that states’ interest in potential life begins
at conception.88 Interestingly, however, even in a case that so clearly set
the stage for Casey, the Court took notice of the lower court’s conclusion
that a provision of the statute, which was akin to the speech-and-display
ultrasound requirements of many recent informed consent statutes, was a
content-based regulation that violated physicians’ First Amendment right
to free speech.89
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey90 began,”[l]iberty finds no refuge in
a jurisprudence of doubt.” 91 Ironically, however, the Casey plurality
84
Id. at 830 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Addressing the First Amendment issue,
Justice O’Connor wrote, “I do not dismiss the possibility that requiring the physician or
counselor to read aloud the State’s printed materials if the woman wishes access to them
but cannot read raises First Amendment concerns. Even the requirement that women who
can read be informed of the availability of those materials, and furnished with them on
request, may create some possibility that the physician or counselor is being required to
‘communicate [the State’s] ideology.’”).
85
Id. at 789–90.
86
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
87
See id. at 518.
88
Id. (“This Court has emphasized that Roe implies no limitation on a State’s
authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and the preamble
can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment . . . There is also no reason why
the State’s compelling interest in protecting potential human life should not extend
throughout pregnancy rather than coming into existence only at the point of viability.
Thus, the Roe trimester framework should be abandoned.”) (citations omitted).
89
Id. at 512 (“In a separate opinion, Judge Arnold argued that Missouri’s prohibition
violated the First Amendment because it ‘sharply discriminate[s] between kinds of
speech on the basis of their viewpoint: a physician, for example, could discourage
an abortion, or counsel against it, while in a public facility, but he or she could not
encourage or counsel in favor of it.’”).
90
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
91
Id. at 844.
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opinion introduced a standard that has created tremendous doubt and
ambiguity in an already confused and controversial abortion
jurisprudence.92 In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court: (1) manipulated
the essential holdings of Roe v. Wade by including the word “undue,”
which allowed for exponentially more regulation of abortion; 93 (2)
disposed of the trimester framework and the application of strict scrutiny
to statutes that regulate abortion; 94 and (3) overturned Akron 95 and
Thornburgh, 96 which had held that abortion informed consent laws
cannot intentionally influence a woman’s choice.97

92

See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
585 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Today we abide Casey, whose force much of the argument here
fails to acknowledge. It bears reminding that Roe survived Casey only in a recast
form . . . We must and do apply today’s rules as best we can without hubris and with less
sureness than we would prefer . . . .”).
93
Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“Whatever the ‘central holding’ of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes
dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to
precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way
a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”).
94
Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“It seems particularly
ungrateful to carve the trimester framework out of the core of Roe, since its very rigidity
(in sharp contrast to the utter indeterminability of the ‘undue burden’ test) is probably the
only reason the Court is able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe ‘has in no sense
proven unworkable,’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
96
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
97
See Akron, 462 U.S. at 442–49; see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760 (“[W]e have
consistently rejected state efforts to prejudice a woman’s choice, either by limiting the
information available to her, or by ‘requir[ing] the delivery of information designed ‘to
influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’”) (citations
omitted). The Court also supplanted the Salerno standard for facial challenges with the
undue burden standard in the abortion context. See generally United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See also Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d
526, 529 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he facial challenge standard should include a factual
inquiry in abortion regulation cases. Justice O’Connor wrote: ‘In striking down the
Pennsylvania law, we did not require [plaintiffs] to show that the provision would be
invalid in all circumstances.’ Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Souter, emphasized that
a law constitutes an ‘undue burden,’ and is therefore invalid, if ‘in a large fraction of the
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion.’”) (citations omitted); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 483
(7th Cir. 1999) (“In Casey, the Court appears to have tempered, if not rejected, Salerno’s
stringent “no set of circumstances” standard in the abortion context, without expressly
saying so.”).
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1. The Undue Burden Standard
The undue burden standard was set forth in the plurality opinion of
Casey. 98 In the most complete articulation of the standard, the Court
explained:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free
choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends.99

This explanation, however, is circular, as it fails to adequately
define the key terms that, together, compose this standard.100 Instead of
offering any clear definitions or objective criteria, the plurality attempted
to clarify the standard by providing hypothetical examples of what it
might have considered an undue burden, and what it would not.101 These
examples, many of which will be discussed briefly here, were offered in
a disjointed, piecemeal discussion of the standard in what amounted to a
disjointed and confusing seventy-page decision.102
The undue burden standard is comprised of multiple parts. First, as
stated above, a regulation poses an undue burden if it “has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.”103 Thus, the substantial obstacle prong is
itself a disjunctive test with two parts: purpose and effect.104 A statute is
unconstitutional if its intended purpose is to present a substantial obstacle
by make it more difficult for women to obtain abortions. Even if the state
did not intend to create a substantial obstacle for women seeking
abortions, a statute can be deemed unconstitutional if it nevertheless has
the effect of presenting such an obstacle.105
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Roe, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Id. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–902.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 876-902.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
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a. When Does An Obstacle Become A “Substantial Obstacle?”
Statutes regulating abortion are constitutional unless they have the
purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle for women seeking
abortions.106 Thus, it is important to know precisely when an obstacle
becomes unconstitutionally “substantial.” The Court in Casey did not
define “substantial obstacle” in objective terms, however, or draw any
absolute line differentiating a permissible obstacle from an
unconstitutionally substantial obstacle.107 Rather, the Court stressed that
states may persuade women to choose childbirth but may not impose an
undue burden on their right to choose.108 But it is almost impossible to
determine whether statutes are successfully persuading women to choose
childbirth or unconstitutionally hindering women from obtaining
abortions. Statutes designed to persuade women to choose childbirth
over abortion would measure their success in achieving that goal by the
level of decrease in the rate of abortions. The Court has said, however,
that a decrease in “a large fraction” of women having an abortion is
evidence that the regulation was calculated to hinder, not inform the
woman’s choice.109 The fact that one result, a decrease in the rate of
abortions, can be used to measure the success of a permissible regulation
or to demonstrate an impermissible purpose is highly problematic.
The Court briefly explained that simply making an abortion more
costly or more difficult is not, in itself, a substantial obstacle.110 On the
other hand, the Court held that statutes that prevent a “large fraction” of
women from exercising their right to an abortion do create an undue
106

Id.
Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“In evaluating
abortion regulations under that standard, judges will have to decide whether they place a
‘substantial obstacle’ in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. In that this standard is
based even more on a judge’s subjective determinations than was the trimester
framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent ‘judges from roaming at large in the
constitutional field’ guided only by their personal views. Because the undue burden
standard is plucked from nowhere, the question of what is a ‘substantial obstacle’ to
abortion will undoubtedly engender a variety of conflicting views.”) (citations omitted).
108
Casey, 505 U.S. at 965.
109
Id. at 925.
110
Id. at 874 (“Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or
any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
107
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burden. 111 The Court instructed lower courts to engage in a factual
analysis involving testimony and studies to determine the extent to which
a regulation interferes with women’s right to an abortion, but gave no
explanation as to how those facts should be weighed, or what facts would
transform a permissible obstacle into an unconstitutional one. 112
Unfortunately, lower courts are left guessing at where the Court intended
the line to be drawn.113
b. Is the Statute’s Purpose to Present a Substantial Obstacle?
The legitimacy of states’ purpose is ascertained by evaluating
whether statutes have been calculated to inform or, instead, calculated to
hinder women’s decisions. 114 Statutes have an improper purpose and
present an unconstitutional undue burden if the chosen measures are
calculated to hinder women’s free choice.115 When determining whether
statutes are calculated to hinder women’s free choice or not, the analysis
must be centered on those who are actually affected by the restriction.116
If a statute imposes a more stringent requirement upon minors seeking an
abortion, for example, the focus of the inquiry is how that particular class
of minors is affected; it would not matter if the class of minors
comprised only a small proportion of the total group of women seeking
abortions. 117 Again, the Supreme Court explained that lower courts
should engage in an analysis led by facts, studies, testimony, and
common sense to determine if, of the women affected by the statute, it
would act as a substantial obstacle in a “large fraction” 118 of those
cases.119
111

Id. at 925.
Id. at 991 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“But what is
remarkable about the joint opinion’s fact-intensive analysis is that it does not result in any
measurable clarification of the “undue burden” standard. Rather, the approach of the joint
opinion is, for the most part, simply to highlight certain facts in the record that apparently
strike the three Justices as particularly significant in establishing (or refuting) the
existence of an undue burden; after describing these facts, the opinion then simply
announces that the provision either does or does not impose a “substantial obstacle” or an
“undue burden.”).
113
See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 480 (7th Cir. 1999) (“When is a burden
‘undue’ as opposed to merely incidental?”).
114
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 894 (“The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”).
117
Id.
118
At least one court has struggled to determine when a group becomes a “large
fraction” such that the effect of the statute would warrant invalidating the statute. See A
112
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The Court gave two examples of statutes that would hinder
women’s free choice, and therefore have an impermissible purpose.120
First, the Court explained, unnecessary health regulations that have the
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to women seeking
an abortion impose an undue burden and are unconstitutional. 121
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate as to what is considered an
“unnecessary” health regulation, nor did it give an explanation of when
or how an unnecessary health regulation could be calculated to inform a
woman’s choice.122 The Court stopped short of saying outright that if a
health regulation is unnecessary, it is calculated to hinder a woman’s
choice, although that is arguably the only reasonable inference.123
Statutes that strip women of the ability to make the decision to have
an abortion before their pregnancies proceed beyond the point of
viability would also fit the Court’s paradigm of statutes that are
calculated to hinder women’s choice. 124 This implies that states may
prohibit women from making the ultimate decision to terminate their
pregnancies after viability, which was true even under Roe’s trimester
framework. 125 This also implies, however, that states may prohibit
women from making the earliest possible decision to terminate her

Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir.
2002).
119
Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (“Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert
testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether ‘in a large fraction of the cases
in which [the restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion.’ ‘A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman’s free choice, not hinder it.’”) (citations omitted).
120
Id. at 878.
121
Id.
122
See id.
123
See id. This contradicts the Court’s earlier comment, however, that states are free
to enact measures that are intended to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over
abortion, even if the measures do not further a health interest. Id. at 886. In other words,
the Court implied that unnecessary health regulations are acceptable, so long as they do
not have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of the woman seeking an
abortion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
124
Id. at 879.
125
Id. at 879; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (“For the stage
subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”)
(citations omitted). Sadly, the protections of the trimester framework have been
abandoned, but the ability to hinder women from choosing an abortion is the little
binding precedent that has remained of the holding in Roe.
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pregnancy, as long as the ultimate decision is theirs. 126 The Court’s
failure to address this inference makes it impossible to distinguish
between statutes that unconstitutionally “hinder” women from obtaining
abortions and those that constitutionally delay them, since “to hinder,” by
definition, is “to cause delay, interruption or difficulty in.”127
The Court also offered examples of statutes that would be
calculated to inform women’s free choice, which would therefore have a
proper purpose and would not present an unconstitutional undue
burden.128 First, the Court would find statutes that require disclosure of
information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision
to have an abortion to be calculated to inform women’s choice. 129
Unfortunately, the Court did not supply any real guidelines to instruct
lower courts how to determine whether the given information is truthful,
non-misleading, and relevant.130 While the question of truth may seem
easy to discern, it can become quite difficult in the face of disputed
medical and scientific evidence.131 The Court did not discuss how the
undue burden standard would apply in the event of inconclusive or
126

Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–88.
Hinder Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hin
der?s=t (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). Nevertheless, this rationale led the Court to uphold
the twenty-four hour mandatory waiting period at issue in the case. Casey, 505 U.S. at
879. The Court opined that requiring a woman to wait at least twenty-four hours between
receiving certain information and having an abortion is not a substantial obstacle. Id. The
Plaintiffs presented the Court with evidence that the mandated twenty-four hour waiting
period often resulted in a delay of a week or more before a woman could obtain the
procedure. Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While a general requirement that a
physician notify her patients about the risks of a proposed medical procedure is
appropriate, a rigid requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in practice)
much longer to evaluate the significance of information that is either common knowledge
or irrelevant is an irrational and, therefore, ‘undue’ burden.”). Despite having emphasized
the importance of implementing a highly factual analysis involving testimony and studies
in earlier parts of the opinion, the Court failed to engage in a highly factual analysis on
the real effects of the waiting period. Id. Instead, the Court insensitively, or perhaps
unknowingly, made light of this waiting period without giving any recognition or
acknowledgement to the prolonged difficulties and discomforts of pregnancy that the
women were made to endure during the mandatory waiting period. Id.
128
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
129
Id. at 882–83 (“If the information the State requires to be made available to the
woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible. We also see
no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion
of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those
consequences have no direct relation to her health . . . informed choice need not be
defined in such narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made
irrelevant.”).
130
Id.
131
See generally Osman, supra note 38.
127
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disputed medical authority, or where states exaggerate the credibility of
ill-supported studies and information.132 Determining when information
is misleading is a question separate and apart from the issue of
truthfulness, because even truthful information can be misleading when
taken out of context. 133 The Court again neglected to address this
problem, however. The Court’s failure to acknowledge and provide
guidance with regard to these concerns has led some lower courts to
automatically conclude that if information is truthful, it is therefore nonmisleading, which is certainly not always true.134
c. Does the Statute Have the Effect of Creating A Substantial
Obstacle?
While the Court spent considerable time discussing the “purpose”
prong of the undue burden standard, it provided even less guidance with
regard to the “effect” prong.135 To clarify the “effect” prong, the Court
merely explained that a regulation is unconstitutional if it is a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose in a “large
fraction” of the cases in the group for whom the law is a restriction.136
Unfortunately, the “effect” prong suffers from the same lack of clarity
and definitions as the “purpose” prong. This is concerning, since,
without further guidance, there is almost unfettered discretion bestowed
upon courts in deciding whether the effect of a given regulation is
“substantial” or not.137
2. The Dissenting Opinions in Casey
The Justices who dissented in Casey recognized that the standard,
as promulgated, was ambiguous and would be impossible for the lower
courts to apply consistently.138 The first indication that this standard is
flawed lies in the fact that it was a plurality opinion, with four
independently written dissenting opinions in which six Justices

132

Id.
Id.; see also Vandewalker, supra note 7.
134
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78
(5th Cir. 2012). See generally Osman, supra, note 38; Vandewalker, supra note 7.
135
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–79, 885–97.
136
Id. at 965.; see supra text accompanying note 118.
137
See supra text accompanying note 107.
138
See supra text accompanying note 107.
133
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partook. 139 The Justices’ qualms with this amorphous standard were
made very clear in their dissents.
The most vehement dissent was authored by Justice Scalia, who
maintained that the joint opinion failed to sufficiently clarify the undue
burden standard, and that its failed attempt only demonstrated further
that the standard is unworkable and easy to manipulate.140 Justice Scalia
then engaged in a discussion about the problems that lower courts
attempting to apply this standard would likely encounter in the future.141
The Justice acknowledged the incredible difficulty in determining when
a burden becomes a “substantial burden,” and argued that this ambiguity
invites judges to draw subjective conclusions and use personal opinions
to shape their analysis. 142 Justice Scalia suggested that the differing
conclusions of the plurality and dissenters regarding whether or not the
provisions at issue were “substantial obstacles” exemplified this point.143
C. Relevant Post-Casey Precedent
The Court in Stenberg v. Carhart 144 did not evaluate the
constitutionality of informed consent statutes, but the case is important in
understanding the development of abortion jurisprudence because it
evinces the Court’s slow but continuous shift away from deference to
physicians and toward deference to legislatures. 145 The dissenting
opinion analogized the majority’s reasoning to that of Akron, but
disapprovingly called the majority opinion physician-deferential.146 The
dissent also argued that the state should be able to take a position when
medical authorities are in disagreement, and that the Court should defer
139

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The
joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter provides the narrowest grounds
for the judgments in which various other Justices concurred to form majorities on
different issues. Under the rule of Marks . . . the joint opinion is therefore cited for the
holdings of the Court.”) (citations omitted).
140
Casey, 550 U.S. at 985–86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141
Id. at 984–93.
142
Id. at 992; see also supra text accompanying note 107.
143
Casey, 550 U.S. at 985–87.
144
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
145
Id. at 971 (discussing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) to support
the proposition that there exists “beyond doubt the right of the legislature to resolve
matters upon which physicians disagreed”).
146
Id. at 969 (“The Court’s decision today echoes the Akron Court’s deference to a
physician’s right to practice medicine in the way he or she sees fit. The Court, of course,
does not wish to cite Akron; yet the Court’s holding is indistinguishable from the
reasoning in Akron that Casey repudiated. No doubt exists that today’s holding is based
on a physician-first view which finds its primary support in that now-discredited case.”).
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to the legislature’s position in such cases. 147 The danger in adopting the
dissent’s position, however, is that it allows legislatures, which
undeniably have a political agenda, to manipulate and misconstrue
medical findings and facts.148
The final relevant precedent in understanding the way abortion
jurisprudence has impacted informed consent statutes is Gonzales v.
Carhart. 149 The Court in Gonzales essentially accepted the position
articulated in the Stenberg dissent and adopted a standard that grants
deference to legislative fact-finding, as opposed to the weight of the
medical evidence.150 Importantly, however, the Court stopped short of
granting states complete and unfettered discretion, explaining that the
Court has the duty to engage in its own evaluation of both the law and
the facts where fundamental constitutional rights are involved, especially
where district court testimony demonstrated the falseness of legislative
findings. 151 The dissent in Gonzales criticized the majority for being
overly deferential to the legislature.152
147

Id. at 970 (“The Court fails to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State
to take sides in a medical debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake and
even when leading members of the profession disagree with the conclusions drawn by the
legislature. In Kansas v. Hendricks, we held that disagreements among medical
professionals ‘do not tie the State’s hands in setting the bounds of . . . laws. In fact, it is
precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest
latitude.’ Instead, courts must exercise caution (rather than require deference to the
physician’s treatment decision) when medical uncertainty is present.”) (citations
omitted).
148
See generally Dreweke & Wind, supra note 7. See also Richardson & Nash, supra
note 56.
149
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
150
Id. at 163 (“The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical
uncertainty persists. The Court’s precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial
attack. The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”).
151
Id. at 165–66 (“Although we review congressional fact-finding under a
deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight on
Congress’ findings. The Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake . . . As respondents have noted,
and the District Courts recognized, some recitations in the Act are factually
incorrect . . . Uncritical deference to Congress’ factual findings in these cases is
inappropriate.”).
152
Id. at 175–79 (“The trial courts concluded, in contrast to Congress’ findings, that
‘significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact
D & E] is the safest procedure . . . Today’s opinion supplies no reason to reject those
findings. Nevertheless, despite the District Courts’ appraisal of the weight of the
evidence, and in undisguised conflict with Stenberg, the Court asserts that the Partial–
Birth Abortion Ban Act can survive ‘when . . . medical uncertainty persists.’ This
assertion is bewildering. Not only does it defy the Court’s longstanding precedent
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IV. ABORTION CONFUSION: CIRCUIT COURTS STRUGGLE WITH THE
AMBIGUOUS UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD, FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES, AND INCREASINGLY MANIPULATIVE INFORMED CONSENT
STATUTES
A number of circuit courts that have applied the undue burden
standard to abortion informed consent statutes have echoed Justice
Scalia’s concerns, demonstrating that the obscurity of the undue burden
standard has presented the circuit courts with an incredible challenge.153
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Sundquist, 154 expressly acknowledged that judges can and, in fact, do
disagree regarding the point at which a burden becomes an
unconstitutional undue burden.155 The author of the concurrence did not
seem to find this troubling, commenting that this was not surprising
given the subjective nature of the standard.156 The dissent in Memphis,
on the other hand, found this uncertainty to be very troublesome and
agreed with Justice Scalia that the undue burden standard was easy to
manipulate. 157
In another case, Karlin v. Foust,158 the court was bewildered as it
attempted to distinguish between a burden that is “undue” and one that is
merely “incidental.”159 The Seventh Circuit struggled to make sense of
the undue burden standard, finally concluding that a burden that only
persuades women is acceptable.160 A burden is only undue, the court
concluded, if it actually prevents women from obtaining an abortion that
they would have otherwise had. 161 In the Karlin court’s opinion,
incidental increase in cost or inconvenience of obtaining an abortion does
not present an undue burden unless that increase rises to the level of
affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no carve-out for circumstances of
medical uncertainty; it gives short shrift to the records before us, carefully canvassed by
the District Courts.”) (citations omitted).
153
See cases cited supra note 31.
154
175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999).
155
Id. at 467 (Nelson, J., concurring).
156
Id.
157
Id. at 468 (“The majority’s outcome-driven decision today ignores the standard of
review we are bound to employ in adjudicating such an appeal; perverts the law; and does
violence to the constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed to every female in this
country . . . . to say that the minor female has the right to have an abortion without
parental consent as long as she overcomes extreme logistical hurdles is to say that she has
no right at all.”) (Keith, J., dissenting).
158
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
159
Id. at 480.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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actually preventing women from having access to an abortion.162 The
court upheld the disclosure provision of the informed consent statute
only after concluding that it could be construed to mandate strictly a
topic of discussion, however, reasoning that physicians must have the
ability to use their medical judgment to tailor the content of the
disclosure to the particular circumstances of the woman.163 The court
cautioned against incorporating mandatory disclosures of specific
information that limit physicians’ discretion and medical judgment.164
Years after Karlin, lower courts continue to express uncertainty and
insecurity in applying the undue burden standard. The Okpalobi v.
Foster165 court was puzzled with regard to when courts are permitted to
apply the undue burden standard.166 The Fifth Circuit struggled with the
“purpose” prong of the analysis, and commented that the plurality in
Casey neglected to provide adequate guidance as to how lower courts
should conduct that portion of the analysis.167 In attempting to apply the
undue burden standard and engage in the “purpose” prong of the
analysis, the court concluded that a legislature does not have to expressly
admit to an improper purpose in order for courts to find one, and that
courts should consider “indicia of improper legislative purpose, such as
statutory language, legislative history and context, and related
legislation” in its “purpose” analysis.168 The dissent agreed that the law
had an impermissible purpose, and objected on other grounds.169

162

Id. at 482.
Id. at 473.
164
Karlin, 188 F.3d at 473 (“While [the statute] does strictly require that physicians
must provide their patients with information on a number of specific topics, the district
court’s interpretation of the informed consent requirements allows the physician to use
his or her best medical judgment in determining the exact nature or content of that
information.”).
165
190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
166
Id. at 354.
167
Id. (“The Casey Court provided little, if any, instruction regarding the type of
inquiry lower courts should undertake to determine whether a regulation has the
‘purpose’ of imposing an undue burden on a woman’s right to seek an abortion.”).
168
Id. at 355.
169
Id. at 361 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent because of the elementary
and fundamental errors that the majority has made in its reaction to a statute plainly
aimed at making medical practice more difficult for abortion doctors. The statute may
well constitute an unfair legislative act, but that legislative unfairness cannot be corrected
by an unconstitutional judicial act. In sum, this case presents no case or controversy
under Article III of the Constitution and, consequently, we have no constitutional
authority to decide its merits.”).
163
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On rehearing en banc, the court reached almost the exact opposite
result. 170 The majority concluded that the court lacked Article III
jurisdiction and that the matter extended beyond the scope of their
powers.171 The dissent, however, argued that injunctive relief was the
traditional avenue of recourse for facial challenges to abortion statutes,
citing Casey and a number of other cases that would seem to grant circuit
courts the authority to decide the case on the merits.172 Referencing the
statute in question, the dissent stated that its purpose was unlawful both
because it presented an undue burden that unconstitutionally infringed
upon a fundamental right and also because it was crafted in a way that
attempted to circumvent judicial review. 173 The fact that courts are
unclear not only about how to apply the undue burden standard but also
when it is applicable further demonstrates how flawed the standard is.
In light of the vague and unpredictable meaning of the undue
burden standard, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the standard as it
pleased in A Woman’s Choice – East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman.174
There, the court declined to even make a good-faith inquiry into what the
Supreme Court intended, stating instead that, since the Casey Court did
not give more guidance as to what exactly the term “large fraction”
means, they would not “peer into the dark abyss of speculation” to figure
out when the amount of women affected becomes a “large fraction.”175
Instead, the majority heedlessly concluded that a statute or regulation
that prevents some, but not all, women from having an abortion is
constitutional.176 The majority scoffed at the dissent’s suggestion that a
statute that prevents even just one percent of women from obtaining an
abortion can be an undue burden, if that regulation only affects one

170

See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. (“Sitting as an en banc court, we consider whether the district court properly
enjoined the ‘operation and effect’ of the Louisiana state tort statute at issue, which
provides a private cause of action against medical doctors performing abortions.
Although, in this facial attack on the constitutionality of the statute, consideration of the
merits may have strong appeal to some, we are powerless to act except to say that we
cannot act: these plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these defendants, the
Governor and Attorney General of Louisiana, and consequently we lack Article III
jurisdiction to decide this case.”).
172
Id. at 453 (Parker, J., dissenting).
173
Id. at 443 (“This purpose is illegitimate not only because [the statute] unduly
burdens a constitutionally protected right, but also because it seeks to evade judicial
review.”).
174
305 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
175
Id.
176
Id.
171
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percent of women to begin with.177 In response, the dissent reminded the
majority that the statute should be analyzed based on the impact it has on
those to which it applies, 178 and even submitted that the majority
impermissibly applied the Salerno standard, instead of the appropriate
undue burden standard.179
More recently, in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion
Services v. Lakey, 180 the Fifth Circuit neglected to apply the undue
burden standard because the plaintiff, in a display of artful pleading, only
raised compelled speech claims.181 The Fifth Circuit erred by failing to
apply the undue burden standard, however, as the Supreme Court
“established the undue burden test as the sole standard for assessing the
constitutionality of an abortion regulation, rather than as a threshold
inquiry for triggering strict scrutiny review.”182 Furthermore, the Lakey
court stated that, under Casey, the manner in which physicians provide
information is irrelevant.183 In fact, however, the Court in Casey stated
that the way in which information is delivered to patients could impact
its constitutionality, particularly if it is delivered in a way that is intended
to “shock” the woman or inflict psychological distress.184
177

Id.
Id. at 709 (Wood, J., dissenting).
179
Newman, 305 F.3d at 706–07 (“The first question—how many women must be
affected—is really another way of putting the question about facial challenges that the
majority addresses. In this connection, despite its disclaimers, one is left with the strong
impression that the majority is applying either United States v. Salerno, or something
very close to it. In essence, it holds that a state statute like the one before us now would
be unconstitutional only if there was no set of circumstances under which it was valid—
by which it seems to mean that not a single woman in Indiana would find the law’s
burdens tolerable. This is an impermissible back-door application of Salerno. Worse yet,
it assumes the answer to the question before us: whether the system Indiana wants to put
in place will unduly burden Indiana women. Since the pertinent part of the statute has
never gone into force, the majority indulges in the presumption that the law imposes no
burden at all. But this presumption is found nowhere in our jurisprudence, at least for
laws implicating fundamental constitutional rights. Furthermore, this methodology is
inconsistent with Casey.”).
180
667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
181
Id. at 577.
182
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 1994).
183
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580 (“Casey did not analyze the doctor’s status based on how
he provided ‘specific information.’”).
184
Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 (“To this end, when the State requires the provision of
certain information, the State may not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict
psychological abuse, designed to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercise her
liberty right. This, for example, would appear to preclude a State from requiring a woman
to view graphic literature or films detailing the performance of an abortion operation. Just
as a visual preview of an operation to remove an appendix plays no part in a physician’s
securing informed consent to an appendectomy, a preview of scenes appurtenant to any
178
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The Lakey court also misstated or misunderstood the holding in
Casey when it wrote:
[T]he requirement that, to avoid the description of the sonogram
images, a victim of rape or incest might have to certify her status
as a victim, despite fearing (by the very terms of the certification)
physical reprisal if she makes her status known . . . does not
transgress the First Amendment. If the State could properly
decline to grant any exceptions to the informed-consent
requirement, it cannot create an inappropriate burden on free
speech rights where it simply conditions an exception on a
woman’s admission that she falls within it.185

The Casey Court, however, invalidated the spousal notification
requirement precisely because of the safety issues it raised for affected
women and their families.186 Perhaps the Lakey court realized some of
the flaws of its evaluation of this informed consent law when it wrote,
“[w]e must and do apply today’s rules as best we can without hubris and
with less sureness than we would prefer.”187
The most recent cases that have grappled with the undue burden
standard are a series of related cases referred to here as Rounds I, Rounds
II, and Rounds III.188 All three cases involved the same informed consent
provision, and each contains a dissenting opinion.189 In Rounds I, the
majority found that the provision was unconstitutional, focusing mainly
on the fact that it required physicians to orally convey specific
information to patients. 190 The majority wrote, “[i]n no case has the
major medical intrusion into the human body does not constructively inform the decision
of a woman of the State’s interest in the preservation of the woman’s health or
demonstrate the State’s profound respect for the life of the unborn.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
185
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578.
186
Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94 (“The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to
prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely
make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will
impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant
number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be
deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed
abortion in all cases.”).
187
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 585.
188
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 530 F.3d 724,
753 (8th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716, 722
(8th Cir. 2006).
189
See cases cited supra note 188.
190
Rounds I, 467 F.3d at 722–23.

2013]How the Undue Burden Standard is Eroding Informed Consent 259
Court extended the bounds of permissible regulation to laws which force
unwilling speakers themselves to express a particular ideological
viewpoint about abortion.”191 The dissent, on the other hand, construed
the undue burden standard very liberally, stating that: (1) “a statute does
not constitute an undue burden unless it in a ‘real sense deprive[s]
women of the ultimate decision’”192; (2) a state’s interest in protecting
fetal life implies that a state can use physicians “to inform its citizens
about the ‘philosophic and social arguments’ against abortion;”193 and (3)
the patient has a limited right not to listen. 194 The dissent readily
acknowledged that the statute used frightening terms to convey the
state’s preference for childbirth over abortion.195
In Rounds II, the majority echoed the opinion of the Rounds I
dissent, finding that the categorization of a fetus as a “whole, separate,
unique living human being” 196 was simply biological information that
was “at least as relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion as
the gestational age of the fetus, which was deemed to be relevant in
Casey.” 197 The majority did not engage in a discussion about the
legislature’s purpose in employing this definition of the word “fetus,” or
the effect that this definition might have on women.198 The dissent, on
the other hand, stated that the disclosures the Act required went “far
beyond” the mandates of informed consent laws that have been upheld
by the Supreme Court and circuit courts in the past.199 The dissent stated
that “[r]ather than focusing on medically relevant and factually accurate
information designed to assist a woman’s free choice,” which the
Supreme Court and circuit courts have upheld, the statute in question
“expresses ideological beliefs aimed at making it more difficult for
women to choose abortions,” and that “[t]he obvious objective . . . is to
use the concept of ‘informed consent’ to eliminate abortions.”200 The
191

Id.
Id. at 734 (Gruender, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992)).
193
Id. at 734–35.
194
Id. at 735.
195
Id. at 738.
196
Rounds II, 530 F.3d 724, 736 (8th Cir. 2008).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 739 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
200
Id. at 740–41. More specifically, with regard to the provision that defined a fetus
as a “whole, separate, unique, living human being,” the dissent found that the state was
mandating the dissemination of “metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state
interest in regulating the practice of medicine,” and that, “[s]ince the state can assert no
legitimate interest in defending the compulsory communication of ideological statements
192
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dissent also disapproved of a suicide advisory, which was the focus of
the Eighth Circuit’s en banc analysis in Rounds III.201
In contrast, the majority in Rounds III found that, “[o]n its face, the
suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor
a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”202 Though the majority
evaluated whether the information required in the disclosure was truthful
and non-misleading, that was the extent of its undue burden analysis.203
The majority opinion focused on whether the language of the provision
implied that there was direct causality between abortion and suicide.204
Finding that it only suggested “increased risk,” not direct causality, the
majority decided that despite medical uncertainty, the advisory was
truthful and non-misleading.205 The majority neglected to engage in a
discussion about the effect of the regulation or whether it placed a
“substantial obstacle” in the path of the woman. 206 The court simply
concluded that since the information is truthful and non-misleading it
does not create an undue burden.207 In fact, the majority opinion does
not mention the term “substantial obstacle” a single time.208 The dissent
criticized the majority’s analysis and proposed standard, pointing out the
following evidentiary problem: “[u]nder this proposed test, so long as a
causal link between abortion and suicide would be theoretically possible,
an advisory is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant unless [plaintiff can
prove the absence of a causal link with ‘scientifically accepted
certainty.’”209
The many varying interpretations of the undue burden standard that
have been articulated in circuit court cases since the Supreme Court
which do not pertain to its regulation of the practice of medicine, these provisions can not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 743.
201
Id. at 750 (“The Act’s broad mandate about psychological distress and suicide
ideation is unlike the requirements in other informed consent laws found to be
constitutional, which entrusted the communication of particular medical risks to the
doctor’s best professional judgment.”).
202
Rounds III, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012).
203
Id. at 905–06.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Rounds III, 686 F.3d at 906.
209
Id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Rather than recognizing this emerging
consensus based on the scientific research in the record before the district court and all
the subsequently submitted evidence . . . the majority theorizes about the nature of an
advisory. In the end it arrived at a new test divorced from the standard established in
Casey.”).
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adopted the standard in Casey reveal the enormously vague and circular
nature of the standard.210 Courts are free to pick and choose which facts
are relevant, how to weigh them, and where to draw the lines.211 This
standard is precisely as Justice Scalia suggested—manipulable. 212 A
standard that can be so obviously manipulated to allow judges to infuse
their own personal moral and political viewpoints, particularly in such a
controversial area as abortion, makes the judiciary the enforcer of an
improper agenda, rather than interpreter of the Constitution of the United
States. If the undue burden standard is to remain the analysis for
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion regulations, there must be a
more consistent and uniform approach to its application, or the integrity
of the judicial system, not to mention women’s right to choose, may not
endure.
V. RESTORING ORDER TO ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Bringing Structure and Uniformity to the Undue Burden Standard
Assuming that informed consent statutes were restored to their
former integrity and that paternalistic justifications were abandoned, the
undue burden standard would still require some structure and uniformity
in order to adequately and consistently distinguish between permissible
and impermissible regulations of the abortion procedure. One way to
bring structure to the undue burden standard is to organize its elements
into a disjunctive, three-prong, fact-intensive test. The first step would
be to determine whether the information is truthful, non-misleading, and
relevant to the decision to have an abortion. The second prong would be
an investigation into the true purpose of the statute, as evidenced by
legislative history and any other relevant evidence. Finally, courts would
investigate what the actual effects of the statute are in reality, as
demonstrated through concrete evidence, not theory or conjecture.
These elements are all present in in the current undue burden
standard, but the Court has not provided any clear structure for its
application. Determining that something is an undue burden or a
substantial obstacle is more of a conclusion than a test. The lack of any
consistent analytical process allows courts to pick and choose what to
focus on and makes the standard easy to manipulate. To help circuit
210
211
212

See supra text accompanying notes 107, 112.
Id.
Id.
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courts avoid making arbitrary, inconsistent and unsubstantiated
determinations as to whether a regulation imposes an undue burden, the
application of the undue burden standard should be structured into a
three-prong analysis composed of the concepts disjointedly discussed in
Casey. Circuit courts’ analyses and evaluations should be heavily
concentrated on: (1) whether the information is actually truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion; (2) the true
purpose of the statute or regulation; and (3) the effect of the statute or
regulation. Reformulating the undue burden standard as a three-part test
would force the courts to address all the aspects of the standard, thereby
creating some organization and uniformity in both analysis and outcome.
Circuit courts should first engage in an analysis of whether
proposed disclosures consist of information that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion. In order to
determine the relevance of the information, courts should consider which
approach to informed consent jurisdictions have adopted; “physicianbased” or “patient-based.”213 Furthermore, determining the veracity of
the information should be a heavily factual analysis, informed by
science, studies, and most importantly, physicians’ medical
judgment214—not the opinions and baseless assertions of legislatures.215
Only truthful, complete, medically relevant information should be
included in informed consent statutes. 216 Medically inconclusive or
213

See supra Part II.
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999) (“In reaching this conclusion,
we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a state abortion statute should not
unduly limit a physician’s discretion in making medical determinations; see, e.g., Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396–97 (reasoning that a physician must be afforded adequate
discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337,
355–56 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In Jane L, the
Tenth Circuit held unconstitutional a Utah law that equated viability with twenty weeks
gestational age as measured from conception because, inter alia, the law had the
impermissible purpose of usurping the physician’s responsibility for determining fetal
viability and, thus, providing a vehicle for challenging the holding of Roe v.
Wade . . . the court also rests its conclusion that the Utah legislature adopted the measure
for a forbidden purpose on the fact that the act on its face denied physicians the discretion
granted them under well-established precedent.”).
215
See Roe, supra note 56, at 208 (“The proposed standard of review will incorporate
a closer examination of the scientific foundation underlying specific informed consent
statutes that gives greater deference to the views of the scientific and medical
communities at large, rather than deferring to legislative determinations of medical fact.
Such review is imperative to maintain the integrity of informed consent given
legislatures’ increasing proclivity to misuse scientific or medical information to achieve a
particular, typically political, end.”).
216
See generally Roe, supra note 56.
214

2013]How the Undue Burden Standard is Eroding Informed Consent 263
incomplete information, by its very nature of incompleteness, can be
untruthful and misleading, thereby undermining the purpose of informed
consent and negating the disclosure principles upon which it is based.217
Furthermore, the information contained in all mandatory
disclosures should be limited to the standards, and guidelines of the
associations and authorities that govern the medical profession.218 Such
medical associations are undoubtedly better equipped to determine the
credibility and relevance of medical and scientific information as it
pertains to informed consent than are courts or legislatures. The content
of specific disclosures in informed consent statutes, if there are to be any,
should be evaluated and approved by medical professionals and
researchers and should fall within the parameters of acceptable medical
knowledge, standards, and guidelines. Experts in the medical field
should apprise our informed consent statutes, not the other way around.
After a thorough analysis of the facts and reports from medical
professionals regarding the credibility and relevance of legislatures’
proposed disclosures, courts could determine whether the information is
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion.
First, if a court were to find the mandated information to be untruthful,
misleading, or irrelevant, the undue burden standard should not apply.
The statute should instead fall under the dominion of the First
Amendment because physicians’ free speech rights would be most
directly implicated, not women’s rights. Forcing physicians to disclose
information that is not medically relevant or accurate not only offends
traditional First Amendment notions of autonomy and self-expression but
also forces physicians to betray the trust of their patients and their
profession as a whole. Therefore, such disclosures should be treated as
compelled speech under the First Amendment and reviewed under strict
scrutiny.
Alternatively, if legislatures want to voice their preference for
childbirth and their respect for potential life through disclosures of
medically inconclusive information, they should be required to
simultaneously disclose that: (1) the information is incomplete or
inconclusive; (2) the state is voicing its express preference for childbirth
over abortion; and (3) there are alternative perspectives regarding
abortion generally. Under this alternative, legislatures could still express
their preference for childbirth over abortion and make women aware of
inconclusive medical information that might persuade women not to
217
218

See Vandewalker, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11.
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have abortions, but they could not manipulate women into thinking the
information is neutral, complete, and certain.
If courts find proposed disclosures to be truthful, non-misleading,
and relevant, they should then scrutinize statutes’ purpose. Courts
should not simply defer to legislatures’ stated purpose. Courts should
consider legislatures’ stated purpose, but they should also examine other
factors, such as the nature and quality of the information in proposed
disclosures, statutes’ legislative history, states’ holistic policy regarding
women’s reproductive health, and statutes’ legal and medical
importance. Though it is not courts’ responsibility to evaluate states’
policy decisions, it is courts’ job to ensure that laws upon which those
policies are built fall within the boundaries of the Constitution.
If, for example, a legislature were to pass a law that satisfies the
first prong of the analysis but requires actions or disclosures that that are
medically and legally superfluous, then a court should conclude that the
statute has an impermissible purpose; that the legislature was not
attempting to protect the life and health of the mother or the potential life
of the fetus. In that instance, the burden imposed by the law and its
dissuasive effects should not be permissible. If, however, a court were to
find that the law served some medically or legally relevant purpose, then
any dissuasive effect the statute has might be permissible, and not an
undue burden, because of the other legitimate accomplishments of that
law.
Even statutes with honest and appropriate informational
disclosures, enacted for permissible purposes, could pose an undue
burden as applied. Therefore, courts should evaluate statutes’ actual
effects on women’s ability to obtain abortions. This step of the analysis
is what courts have tended to focus on up to this point.219 Like the rest of
the undue burden analysis and as Justice O’Connor suggested, statutes’
effects should be evaluated using a highly factual analysis. 220
Conclusions that statutes’ present either mere inconvenience or undue
burden should not rest on judges or legislatures baseless opinions as to
statutes’ effects. Rather, courts should engage in a factual analysis,
informed by studies and statistics from the given state and, where
applicable, testimony from women who have been impacted by the
legislation.
Courts will inevitably have the most discretion during this prong of
the analysis, but they should still attempt to maintain uniformity and
219
220

See, e.g., supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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consistency. Implementing a fact-intensive analysis, informed by
studies, testimony, and other reliable evidence, will make it more
difficult for courts to ignore the realities of statutes’ impact when
deciding whether the effect of a statute presents an undue burden for
women seeking abortions.221 For example, a court should not conclude
that a twenty-four hour waiting period is not an undue burden if the
evidence and studies demonstrate that it actually results in a delay of a
week or more for most women.222 Nor should a court conclude that a
disclosure stating that an abortion can lead to an increased risk of suicide
or cancer is truthful and non-misleading, and therefore not unduly
burdensome, when medical evidence does not support those claims.
Rather, courts should carefully consider the evidence to determine,
objectively, whether a “large fraction” of the women affected by the
statute are prevented from obtaining an abortion, or are otherwise facing
an undue burden, such as being restricted from the most common types
of abortion.223 Courts should also define “large fraction” in numerical
terms, as being fifty percent of women affect or more, for example. The
determinations made in each step of this analysis should lead to the
conclusion that a given regulation is a substantial obstacle or undue
burden, and therefore unconstitutional, as opposed to using the term
“substantial obstacle” itself as the test.
As Justice O’Connor suggested, a highly fact-intensive analysis is
the only way to make the undue burden standard workable and avoid
arbitrary and capricious application. 224 Engaging in a factual analysis
would force legislatures to stay true to the purposes of protecting the
health and life of the mother and the potential life of the fetus, while still
allowing them to express their preference for childbirth over abortion. It
221

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) (“By
basing its rulings on informed consent and recordkeeping ‘on the record,’ the Court
signaled that it was not announcing a per se rule. At a minimum, we believe the Court
meant that other state abortion laws require individualized application of the undue
burden standard. Our view is bolstered by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
denying a stay in Fargo Women’s Health Organization v. Schafer . . . which noted: ‘the
joint opinion [in Casey III] specifically examined the record developed in the district
court in determining that Pennsylvania’s informed consent provision did not create an
undue burden . . . . [T]he lower courts [in Fargo] should have undertaken the same
analysis,’ and ‘[t]he fact-bound nature of the new standard-inquiring if the law is a
“substantial obstacle,”‘ Casey III suggests that a challenge after enforcement of the
Pennsylvania Act might yield a different result on its constitutionality.’”) (citations
omitted).
222
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 969 (1992).
223
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
224
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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would also assist circuit court judges in evaluating this very personal,
emotional, and controversial issue rationally, without improperly
considering their own moral or political convictions. Adopting the
proposed solution is the best way to truly protect women’s fundamental
right to terminate their pregnancies, and to control their own health and
lives. Taking a structured approach is the best way to accomplish
uniformity and consistency in the application of the undue burden
standard, and the only way to avoid its arbitrary and capricious
application.
B. Reviving the Spirit of Informed Consent: Limiting Includable
Information to Medical Facts and Excluding Ideology by Denying
Deference to Legislature
The greatest danger recent informed consent statutes pose is that
they manipulate women, who are already in a very vulnerable position,
into thinking that they are being given unbiased, complete information,
when in reality Casey and its progeny have invited legislatures to turn
informed consent statutes into covert vehicles for delivering states’
ideology.225 Legislatures justify this practice by arguing that abortion is
different because it involves the termination of a potential life. 226 Of
course, it is true that abortion is different, and perhaps this ideological
information should be available to women, but it should not be
surreptitiously incorporated into informed consent statutes. All people,
including women, assume the information physicians disclose while
obtaining patients’ informed consent to abortion is straightforward,
objective, medical information because for all other medical procedures
it is.227
Informed consent in the abortion context should be no different
than that of any other medical procedure. 228 It should be limited to
scientific and medical information that is supported by the weight of
authority, inform the patient of any included information that is
inconclusive or for which there is disagreement among medical
professionals, and be free from information that is ideological or that is
not directly related to the procedure.229 Allowing states to express their
viewpoints covertly through mandatory disclosures in informed consent
225
226
227
228
229
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statutes gives states license to manipulate women and prevent them from
making truly informed choices.230
The informed consent disclosure standards discussed in Part I,
namely, the professional practice, reasonable person, and selfdetermination standards, do not currently play any role in the evaluation
of the constitutionality of abortion informed consent laws.231 The undue
burden standard should incorporate these different standards to eliminate
some of the ambiguity in deciding what is “relevant” to a woman’s
decision to have an abortion. Currently, under the undue burden
standard legislatures have the greatest authority to decide what is
relevant. 232 If these standards were considered, however, abortion
informed consent laws would begin to fall in line with states’ general
informed consent laws with regard to who gets to decide the relevance
and materiality of informational disclosures.233
C. Disallowing Paternalism as an Acceptable Justification for Informed
Consent Statutes
Legislatures have justified many recent informed consent statute
requirements, such as mandatory waiting periods, by arguing that women
benefit by being “given” the extra time to reflect upon their options
before making their decision. 234 Courts have accepted different
variations of this rationale as legitimate. 235 This rationale perpetuates
stereotypes and the paternalistic notion that women need protection and
are incapable of making difficult decisions on their own. 236 It also
assumes that women do not spend the appropriate amount of time
reflecting upon their options and circumstances before deciding to get an
abortion, and that they cannot have, know, or understand their options
without these mandatory disclosures and waiting periods.237 In reality,
however, women are more than capable of making these decisions on
their own.238 Studies have shown that “women who make the decision to
230
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have an abortion understand the responsibilities of parenthood and
family life; 239 six in ten are already a parent.” 240 More than half of
women who have an abortion say they want a child or another child at a
later point in their life. 241 Most cite concern or responsibility for
someone else as a factor in their decision. 242 These and other such
studies should be recognized and considered during courts’ analyses and
should prevent such paternalistic notions about women from being
perceived as legitimate and compelling justifications for some
requirements of recent informed consent statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is true that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt,”243 but Justice Scalia was right to retort that “[r]eason finds no
refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion,” either.244 Restructuring the
undue burden standard into a disjunctive, three-part test in which each
prong is analyzed using objective criteria and a heavily factual analysis is
a comprehensive approach to making to making the undue burden
standard workable in practice. This approach would still allow states to
further their interests in preserving potential life and persuading women
to choose childbirth, but would be much more effective in protecting
women’s rights than the undue burden standard in its current form.
Some solution must be adopted, because as it stands the undue burden
standard is too easy to manipulate and allows states to maneuver around
the safeguards the Supreme Court has attempted to put into place.
Furthermore, in order to preserve the integrity of the doctrine of
informed consent, the physician-patient relationship, and the medical
profession in general, courts must engage in an independent analysis of
the accuracy of mandated factual disclosures and refrain from the
admittedly easier but ineffective practice of giving deference to
legislative fact-finding.245 Moreover, when considering the purpose of a
given statute, paternalistic notions should be abandoned as illegitimate
and unacceptable justifications for any statutes that regulate abortion. By
reducing unwarranted judicial deference to legislative fact-finding,
239
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eliminating paternalism, and only then proceeding to a structured
analysis of constitutionality under the undue burden standard, courts can
finally achieve consistency in their analyses and holdings for similar
statutes, increase the legitimacy of the judicial system, and more
effectively protect the rights of women in this delicate and controversial
area.

